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Abstract. This paper examines the repercussions of cross-border production sharing 
for the welfare effects of preferential trade liberalization.  In a general-equilibrium 
context, a free trade agreement (FTA), which incorporates production sharing, raises 
the likelihood of welfare improvement.  Thus, two members of a free trade area, who 
each have comparative disadvantage in the production of a final product relative to a 
non-member, may nevertheless enjoy net trade creation if they jointly possess 
comparative advantage in key components of that product.  At a minimum, cross-
border production sharing reduces the trade-diverting elements of an FTA.  It 
follows, that rules of origin, viewed as constraints on cross-border fragmentation, 
augment the negative, trade-diverting elements of free trade areas.       
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1. Introduction 
As globalization spreads, markets are becoming more integrated across countries and 
economic activities more linked and intertwined.  Continuing progress in trade and 
investment liberalization, as well as declining communication and transportation 
costs, play an important role in this process.  As economies become more open and 
market access is improved, trade grows and production spreads across borders.  As a 
result, end products entering into international trade contain parts and components 
from many countries.  
The focus of this paper is on factors that inhibit and factors that encourage 
cross-border sourcing and their implications for the welfare effects of preferential 
trade liberalization.  This is an important issue, because the welfare effects of cross-
border production fragmentation are not independent of the trade policy regime.  
Under conditions of free trade in a standard trade model, for example, cross-border 
sourcing of components is welfare-enhancing.  Its effects are analogous to those of 
technical progress.  In the context of a most-favored-nation tariff regime (MFN), on 
the other hand, it may be welfare-reducing.2    
The simplest models of preferential trade liberalization deal with trade in 
products that are produced entirely within national boundaries.  Comparative 
advantage considerations then provide ready efficiency assessments and welfare 
calculations.  In this framework, trade creation arises when imports of a finished or 
intermediate product from a partner country replace domestic production. Trade 
19 
20                                  THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ASYMMETRIES                                  MAY 2004 
diversion, on the other hand, is associated with the shift of imports from low-cost 
outsiders to higher-cost FTA partners.  In this context, the welfare effects of 
preferential trade liberalization are ambiguous.   
Our interest, however, is in a deeper form of preferential trade liberalization, 
one that facilitates production sharing across borders.  Here, the comparison of 
interest is not between the cost of producing an entire product in the countries 
involved, but comparison between fully home-based production in the non-member 
country and cross-border production sharing by the FTA members.    
The intuition is that a country may be the world’s low-cost producer of a 
product, without necessarily being the low-cost producer of every one of its 
components.  When production of the product shifts from a nationally integrated set-
up in the non-member country to a regionally fragmented production framework 
inside the preference area, the trade creating and trade diverting elements are 
rearranged in important ways.     
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the welfare effects of cross-border component sourcing under a variety of 
trade policy regimes.  Section 3 employs a two-country general-equilibrium trade 
model to examine the effects of rules of origin, when these are interpreted as 
interventions designed to prevent optimal component sourcing.  Section 4 examines 
the effects of cross-border component sourcing on domestic production and welfare 
in a simple partial-equilibrium framework.  Section 5 employs a three-country, 
partial-equilibrium model to assess the extent of trade diversion in discriminatory 
trade liberalization with and without component specialization.  Section 6 concludes. 
    
2. Production Sharing, the Trade Regime, and Welfare  
The welfare effects of cross-border fragmentation and production sharing have 
received considerable attention in the recent literature.3  Under conditions of free 
trade, cross-border production sharing in either the import or the export sector of a 
small country unambiguously raises national welfare as it extends specialization 
from the level of products to that of parts, components and assembly.  When it takes 
place in a large country, it generates terms-of-trade effects, which may augment or 
undermine the welfare effects of production sharing per se.  Since it tends to increase 
domestic output in the sector in which it occurs, it turns the terms of trade in favor of 
the country when it takes place in the import sector and against it when it occurs in 
the export sector.4   These tendencies are reinforced by complementary adjustments 
in the trading partner, when that country is also large.  Then, output of the good 
subject to production sharing increases there as well, so that the price-depressing 
effects are enhanced.5    
In a small country, cross-border fragmentation is also welfare-creating when 
it is part of a preferential trade agreement, and may thus turn an otherwise trade-
diverting PTA into a trade-creating one.  For large countries, the effects of 
production sharing on the terms of trade need to be taken into account along the lines 
discussed above.  
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The welfare effects of cross-border production fragmentation are ambiguous, 
however, when it is introduced in the context of most-favored-nation (MFN) trade 
policy.  It is more likely to be welfare-reducing, the larger the wedge between the 
tariff-inclusive domestic price and the world price.  Technically, the condition for 
welfare improvement is that the Rybzsynski line must be flatter than the relative 
world price in the standard general equilibrium trade model.6   
Cross-border sourcing has potentially important implications for how we 
assess “exposure” to foreign competition of so-called non-tradables industries.  
When production is fragmentable, goods and services that are non-tradable as such, 
may contain parts and components that are.  When a non-tradable good or service 
contains tradable parts and components, its insulation from foreign competition is 
reduced as the domestic factors of production employed in component production are 
exposed to competition from abroad.   
Cross-border production sharing and component sourcing by non-tradables 
industries not only affect national welfare (by shifting out the production possibility 
frontier in a manner similar to technological progress), but also have implications for 
the real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of tradables prices to non-tradables prices.   
It is well-known that market-clearing conditions in the non-tradables sector play a 
key role in determining the real exchange rate (Arndt, 2004). Hence, when offshore 
sourcing of tradable components reduces costs and thus prices of non-tradables 
relative to tradables, the resultant increase in the ratio of tradables to non-tradables 
prices is equivalent to a depreciation of the country’s real exchange rate.  A shift to 
offshore sourcing in the non-tradables sector is thus accompanied by real 
depreciation of the country’s currency. 
The ability of non-tradables producers to use offshore sourcing of 
components to increase their competitiveness relative to tradables producers enables 
them to compete more effectively for domestic resources, and thereby raises output 
and employment in the non-tradables sector.  Meanwhile, the depreciation of the 
country’s real exchange rate, raises output in the tradables sector as well, implying 
that offshore sourcing by non-tradables industries raises output throughout the 
economy.   The rise in tradables output and decline in tradables demand improve the 
trade balance.   
  
3.  Rules of Origin 
Rules of origin, also known as domestic-content requirements, are designed to 
prevent producers in free trade areas from exploiting differences among members’ 
tariff levels through cross-border sourcing of components from non-members.  If 
country A has a lower tariff on component imports than its FTA partner, country B, 
the producers in A may use components from non-members to gain a competitive 
edge in B’s markets.  Rules of origin are policies specifically designed to control 
such offshore sourcing.  
To the extent that rules of origin restrict country A’s producers from third-
country sourcing of parts and components, they cause the country’s production 
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possibility curve to contract relative to its optimal, unconstrained position.7 We 
examine the welfare implications with the aid of Figure 1.  Suppose that the 
production blocks represent the two countries, A and B, respectively, which have 
formed a free trade area and that Pfta is the intra-FTA relative price.  Assume for 
simplicity that tastes are identical in the two countries, so that the initial equilibrium 
consumption bundle for each nation is given at point Co.  Production takes place at 
points Qa and Qb, respectively, with country A exporting good Y and importing good 
X.  Suppose further that the conditions depicted by the two production blocks 
involve offshore sourcing by both countries of components from low-cost non-
member sources.8    
Suppose that country A enforces the rules-of-origin provisions of the treaty.  
Producers in country B have two options, depending on the relative sizes of 
applicable tariffs.  They can continue to source components outside the FTA and pay 
the partner’s tariff.  They can, alternatively, shift the sourcing of components to FTA 
suppliers in order to avoid the partner’s tariff on third-country value-added.  The 
latter will be the preferred course of action, if the cost savings inherent in third-
country sourcing are smaller than the tariff.   
If the response is to shift component sourcing to intra-FTA suppliers, the 
effect is to shift B’s production possibility curve inward along the X-axis to, say, 
TB’.  As a result, the intra-FTA price of X rises to Pfta’, which represents a worsening 
of country A’s terms of trade.  Production of good X rises in country A and falls in 
country B.   Consumption in both countries moves to a lower indifference curve to 
reflect the welfare loss inflicted on both by country A’s implementation of the rules-
of-origin requirements.9 
Free trade areas are known to generate both trade-creating and trade-diverting 
welfare changes.  The latter may dominate the former and thus reduce welfare 
relative to an MFN tariff regime.  The foregoing suggests that rules of origin 
introduce an additional element of trade diversion and thereby increase the likelihood 
that an FTA will be welfare-reducing.   
The situation is made still worse, if country B elects to enforce rules-of-origin 
provisions against imports of good Y from country A that contain components from 
non-member sources.  If country A responds by shifting to domestic, higher-cost 
components, then country A’s production block will shift inward along the Y-axis 
and welfare will fall further in both countries.   
Note, that while the common external tariff eliminates the need for rules of 
origin in customs unions, determination of a non-zero common tariff may require 
some countries to raise duties on component imports from non-members.  To the 
extent that this change inhibits component sourcing from non-members, it has the 
effect of contracting members’ production possibility curves along the axes of 
sectors engaged in such offshore sourcing and is thus welfare-reducing. 
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4.  Production Sharing and Trade Diversion 
As noted above, preferential trade liberalization can be welfare-reducing on balance.  
The question is whether cross-border fragmentation of production worsens or 
improves the welfare effect of traditional preferential trade liberalization.  It will be 
recalled that in the traditional set-up, the shift of production from domestic producers 
to the partner country is an important source of trade creation, while the shift of 
production from the low-cost outsider to the partner country is the source of trade 
diversion.  From this perspective, therefore, a NAFTA-induced shift of U.S. 
automobile imports from Japan to Mexico would clearly suggest trade diversion. 
While such a conclusion is doubtlessly justified under the assumption that 
automobiles are produced in their entirety in every country, it is less automatic under 
conditions of cross-border fragmentation and production sharing between the partner 
countries.  Automobiles imported by the U.S. from Mexico contain components 
made in the U.S.   If Mexico is the low-cost producer of some component or of 
assembly, then the shift of those activities from Japan to Mexico is an element of 
trade creation.  Any trade diversion can then arise only in the remainder of the 
production chain.  If the U.S. is the low-cost producer of the components it supplies 
to Mexico, then the extent of trade creation is increased and the range of activities 
subject to trade diversion is further limited.  The net welfare effect of the shift in 
production, which was once clearly negative, is now ambiguous. 
The essential point of the foregoing is that unless Japan is the low-cost 
producer of every activity in the production chain, cross-border fragmentation and 
production sharing between the trade area partners reduces the trade-diverting 
elements of preferential trade liberalization.  The intuition may be set out with the 
help of a simple numerical example.  Suppose that the respective costs of the two 
components of a hypothetical product are $9 and $7 in country A, $10 and $4 in 
country J, and $17 and $1 in country M.  When production takes place entirely 
within the boundaries of each country, a unit of product costs $16, $14, and $18, in 
the three countries, respectively, giving country J a comparative cost edge over the 
other two. 
When countries A and M form a free trade area and engage in production 
sharing, with A producing the first and M the second component, joint cost of a unit 
of the good declines to $10.  While, neither country is able to compete with country J 
without cross-border fragmentation, intra-product specialization enables them to 
become competitive.     
In order to assess the supply-side implications of cross-border fragmentation 
and production sharing, we start with a partial-equilibrium representation of the 
import sector of a partner country.  In Figure 2, curve DD represents domestic 
demand for the imported product, X, while domestic supply in the absence of cross-
border fragmentation is given by curve Sx1+x2.   The product is assumed to be made 
up of two components, x1 and x2, where production of the former is intensive in the 
country’s abundant factor.  Line Sx1+x2* represents costs of production when the first     
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component, in which the country is assumed to have comparative advantage, is 
produced at home, and the second component is imported from a lower-cost foreign 
source. 
The shift from local production to cross-border fragmentation, represented by 
the move from the first to the second supply curve, is welfare-increasing.  If the 
country is small and the price of product X is given at Po, then the gains from cross-
border fragmentation accrue in the form of producer surplus (encompassed by area 
bckf) and increased employment (implicit in the rise in production from 0q to 0n).  
The value of X-production rises from 0abq to 0acn.  Not all of this increase in value 
accrues to the country, however.  The value of imported component x2 is given by 
area acdf.  The rise in domestic value added is therefore equal to the difference 
between areas ednq and abef.    
Hence, both the quantity of X-production and the value of domestic 
production increase.  While this is clearly positive from the point of view of the 
domestic industry, workers formerly engaged in producing component x2 have lost 
their jobs.  If those workers can find employment in production of component x1, 
output of which clearly rises, they will remain employed in the industry and new 
workers may also be drawn into the industry.  
The buffer provided by outsourcing can be seen if it is assumed that the world 
price of X is falling.  In the absence of cross-border sourcing, domestic production of 
good X declines along supply curve Sx1+x2, with output and employment falling in 
the industry.  Cross-border procurement of component x2, on the other hand, shifts 
the supply curve out, moving production at the initial price to point c, so that when 
the negative world price shock occurs, domestic production declines along supply 
curve Sx1+x2*.   It is evident, that cross-border fragmentation of production enhances 
the domestic industry’s ability to fend off foreign competition.   
The benefits conferred on domestic welfare by cross-border component 
procurement depend on several factors, including the share of imported components 
in total production.  A rising share shifts down the Sx1 curve to, say, Sx1’, which 
raises the share of foreign value-added and lowers the share of domestic value-added 
and hence reduces the benefits from cross-border operations.10    
The net effect also depends on the cost-savings inherent in offshore 
procurement.  A rise in savings widens the gap between the top two supply curves, 
thereby increasing domestic production when the second component is imported and 
raising both employment opportunities and domestic value added.  
   
5.  A Three-Country Model of Economic Integration with Production Sharing  
The focus in Figure 3 is on import demands and export supplies, that is, on the 
excesses between domestic demand and supply in importing and exporting countries, 
respectively.  Demand curve D1D2D3 represents the difference between domestic 
demand and domestic supply in country A.  It is the country’s net import demand 
curve.  Curve D3D3 is the country’s domestic demand curve; it becomes net import 
demand at point D2, when domestic production goes to zero.  Function Sj+t represents 
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the tariff-inclusive net export supply of country J, while Sj is that country’s pre-tariff 
net export supply.  The initial MFN equilibrium, given at the intersection of net 
import demand and country J’s tariff-inclusive net export supply, generates the 
domestic tariff-inclusive price, Pd, at which country A imports quantity 0qo from 
country J.  Output of X in country A is equal to the distance cd. 
Introduction of a traditional free trade area between country A and country M 
reduces the price of X within the area to Pfta.   This price is determined at the 
intersection between country A’s import demand and supply curve Sm+j+t, which 
represents the sum of tariff-free export supply from country M and tariff-inclusive 
export supply from country J.  Country A’s total imports expand from 0qo to 0q1, 
while imports from country J decline from 0qo to 0q2.  Imports from country M are 
equal to q2q1 (equal to fh).  Domestic production in country A falls to hk.  The 
reduction in country A’s demand for imports from J forces that country to lower its 
supply price from Pj to Pj’, providing country A with an improvement in the terms of 
trade. 
Formation of the trade area generates the following welfare changes.  Area 
acge represents domestic welfare transfers from government revenue to consumer 
surplus, while triangle cgh reflects welfare improvements due to trade creation and 
the consumption effect.  Rectangle fgsr represents welfare losses due to trade 
diversion.  It is clear that, terms-of-trade changes apart, the net welfare effect is 
ambiguous.  It appears to be negative as drawn, with the magnitude of the area of 
trade diversion greater than that of the area of trade creation, but with steeper supply 
curves it will quickly turn positive.  Inspection of the figure suggests further that the 
free trade area is more likely to be welfare-improving as the gap between supply 
curves Sm+j+t and Sj shrinks.  
      For large countries, formation of a free trade area will typically involve 
changes in the terms of trade, brought about by changes in the importing country’s 
demand for goods from non-members.  Area qrut (=abfe) gives the welfare gain due 
to the improvement in country A’s terms-of-trade vis-a-vis country J. Terms-of-trade 
gains help offset welfare losses due to trade diversion.     
   Suppose that economic integration between countries A and M is deepened 
by introduction of cross-border component trade, such that country M is able to 
reduce production costs of good X by obtaining certain components at lower cost 
from country A.  Reduced costs shift down country M’s domestic supply curve (not 
shown), which in turn shifts out the country’s export supply curve and thus curve 
Sm+j+t to, say, Sm+j+t’.  This shift reduces the gap relative to country J’s tariff-free 
supply curve.   
      Equilibrium moves from h to n, where the new joint export supply curve of 
countries J and M intersects country A’s import demand.  The intra-area price of X 
falls to Pps.  Relative to the initial MFN equilibrium, the area reflecting trade creation 
and consumption gains expands to triangle cjn, while trade diversion is now given by 
rectangle ljsx.  The region of trade diversion thus shrinks vertically by rectangle fgji, 
but expands horizontally by rectangle lirx.  It is clear that the net effect is ambiguous.  
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The first rectangle will expand and the second shrink as the supply curves become 
steeper.      
     In this process of adjustment, area fhmi is the welfare gain due to the lower 
price at which imports from country M are now available.  Area lirx, on the other 
hand, is welfare-reducing because low-cost imports from Japan (equal to quantity li 
or q4q2) are replaced by higher-cost imports from country M.   
   The reduction in country A’s demand for imports from J is now larger than 
in the case of a free trade area without production sharing, which forces country J to 
offer still deeper price concessions.  J’s supply price falls to Pj”.  The welfare gains 
due to this terms-of-trade improvement are given by area qxwv.11     
Cross-border component sourcing thus allows country M to reduce costs and 
those cost savings redound to the advantage of consumers in country A.12     The 
magnitude of these benefits depends on the cost improvements brought about by 
cross-border production sharing between the area partners.  Greater cost savings 
generate a more pronounced downward shift of the Sm+j+t curve.    
The analysis of cross-border production fragmentation has thus far focused on 
cost savings in the production of X in country M.  As the discussion of Figure 2 
suggests, however, country A may also enjoy cost savings if its producers are able to 
obtain low-cost components from country M.  Then, A’s domestic supply curve (not 
shown in Figure 3) shifts down, causing A’s import demand curve to shift left in 
Figure 3. This shift reduces the price of good X still further, generating additional 
changes along all the margins discussed above. 
Finally, cross-border fragmentation affects production of components.  The 
shift of X-production from country A to country M reduces component production in 
country A.  In the two-component example discussed above, the decision by country 
M to source component x1 in country A raises production of that component in 
country A.  Production of that component will rise still further if country A is able to 
achieve cost savings by procuring component x2 from country M and thereby to raise 
its own X-output along the lines shown in Figure 2.  These adjustments generate 
additional welfare effects. 
Taken together, the various elements of the foregoing discussion serve as a 
reminder that in the presence of cross-border component sourcing, the shift of 
imports of a finished product from a low-cost non-member to a member complicates 
the welfare analysis.13  
  
6.  Concluding Comments 
This paper has focused on the welfare effects of preferential trade liberalization 
which is accompanied by cross-border component sourcing.  When trade involves 
finished products only, the extent of trade diversion depends on the differences 
among product prices in the countries involved.  When production processes are 
fragmentable and trade integration gives rise to cross-border component sourcing, 
the prices of final goods are changed and the welfare calculus is altered.  This 
possibility arises from the likelihood that a country may possess comparative 
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advantage at the product level without commanding comparative advantage at every 
stage along the production chain. 
This issue is explored in both partial- and general-equilibrium terms.  It is 
shown that replacing imports of end products made in their entirety outside a free 
trade area (FTA) with products subject to production sharing inside the area may 
reduce the extent of trade diversion.  Cross-border component sourcing among the 
partners of a free trade area is, thus, capable of converting a trade-diverting free trade 
area into a trade-creating one.  
It is further shown that rules of origin, interpreted as policies to prevent 
efficient cross-border component sourcing, are welfare-reducing.      
 
Notes 
1 Professor, Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College; Address: 850 
Columbia Ave., Claremont, CA 91711; Telephone: (909) 621-8012; Fax: (909) 607-
8008; E-mail: lowe@claremontmckenna.edu.  An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at a conference on “Structural Reform and the Transformation of 
Organizations and Businesses” at Homerton College, University of Cambridge, 
September 2003.  Helpful comments from conference participants are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
2 See, for example, Arndt (2001, 2004). 
3 See, for example, Arndt (1997, 1998), Deardorff (2001a, 2001b), Jones (2000), 
Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Kohler (2001).  See also Feenstra (1998) and 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996).   
4 Terms-of-trade effects of cross-border production sharing are examined in Arndt 
(2001).  See also Deardorff (2001a). 
5 The implications of production sharing are examined in a two-country model in 
Arndt (2001). 
6 For a detailed workout, see Arndt (2004).   
7 Aspects of the analysis in this section will remind the reader of the “effective rate 
of protection.”  For an initial treatment, see Corden (1966).  For a recent assessment, 
see Greenaway and Milner (2003) and for a comparative analysis of alternative 
measures of trade policy distortions, see Anderson (2003).   
8 In this framework, simplifying assumptions play an essential role.  
Implementation of a free trade area is thus often assumed to shift trade in its entirety 
away from the low-cost non-member country.  Such an extensive reordering of 
production is due to the assumptions embodied in this model.  In the next section, we 
use a three-country, partial-equilibrium framework to examine scenarios in which 
non-members continue to supply the FTA market, while sourcing of components and 
end products shifts to members. 
9 The focus here is on the effect of rules enforcement on the production possibility 
curve and through it on welfare.  If B producers continue to source components 
among non-members and to pay A’s tariff on those components, there will not be a 
single price of X in the region.  There will be upward pressure on the price of good X 
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in A and downward pressure in B.  The price differential between the two countries 
will reflect the size of the tariff and the share of third-country components in product 
X.  
10 This development is reminiscent of Hong Kong’s experience in the electronics 
and textiles sectors, where the bulk of production has gradually shifted to the Pearl 
River Delta. 
11 It is apparent that the welfare gains due to terms of trade changes will vary over 
the range of possible FTA prices below the MFN price.  The nature of the variations 
is governed by considerations similar to those involved in the theory of optimum 
tariffs.  The elasticities of the relevant export supply and import demand curves are 
important here.  
12 These adjustments clearly have implications for trade, production and welfare in 
country M.  There are strong, but not perfect, symmetries with the adjustments 
discussed for country A.  For a closer examination of adjustment in a two-country 
framework, see Arndt (2001). 
13 Country J may also resort to cross-border component sourcing, in which case the 
analysis is further complicated. 
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